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ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION 
IN RETALIATION CASES 
Brian A. Riddellt 
Richard A. Balestt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Employees X, Y, and Z all work for Company A. These employees 
individually file complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), against Company A, because of perceived sexual 
harassment. Subsequently, a supervisor of employee X solicits other 
employees to make negative comments about employee X. Further, 
employee Y receives a negative year-end performance evaluation. Be-
cause a condition of employment requires positive performance evalu-
ations in order to receive pay increases, employee Y is precluded from 
receiving a pay raise. Additionally, employee Z is denied a promotion 
to a position for which he or she is highly qualified. 
This hypothetical presents the issue of whether an action is an ad-
verse employment action, warranting retaliation claims under Title 
VII. The circuits are split three ways on this issue. One group of cir-
cuits adopts an "expansive" approach, defining adverse employment 
action broadly to include any action that is reasonably likely to deter 
alleged victims or others from engaging in future protected activity.l 
Under this approach, X, Y, and Z have been subjected to an adverse 
employment action, because the employer's behavior is likely to deter 
them, or others, from engaging in protected activity in the future. 2 
A second group of circuits adopts an "intermediate" approach, 
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that 
adversely affects the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.3 
Under this approach, employee X has not suffered an adverse employ-
ment action unless he or she can prove that the negative comments 
somehow affected a term, condition, or benefit of employment.4 Sim-
ilarly, employee Z has not suffered an adverse employment action un-
less he or she can demonstrate that the failure to consider him or her 
t Associate, Keating, Muething, & Klekamp (Cincinnati, Ohio). 
tt Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University, Chase College of Law. 
1. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000). 
2. See, e.g., id. 
3. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865-66 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th 
Cir. 1997)). 
4. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243). 
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for the promotion somehow affected a term, benefit, or condition of 
his or her employment.5 However, employee Y may have suffered an 
adverse employment action when he or she received negative com-
ments on his or her year-end evaluation because it prevented him or 
her from receiving a pay raise, which negatively affected a benefit of 
employment (i.e., pay raises) and a term and condition of employ-
ment (i.e., receiving positive performance reviews is a prerequisite to 
receiving pay increases). 6 
A third group of circuits adopts a "restrictive" approach, holding 
that only ultimate employment decisions-such as hiring, firing, pro-
moting, and demoting-constitute actionable adverse employment ac-
tions. 7 Under this approach, neither employee Xnor employee Yhas 
suffered an adverse employment action because negative comments 
from fellow employees, negative comments on performance reviews, 
and failures to obtain pay raises do not constitute ultimate employ-
ment decisions.s Employee Z, however, has suffered an adverse em-
ployment action because matters concerning promotions constitute 
ultimate employment decisions.9 
This article argues that the circuits should adopt the expansive ap-
proach in determining what constitutes adverse employment action in 
the retaliation context. Part II discusses generally the burden-shifting 
framework used by the circuits in evaluating retaliation claims under 
Tide VII. Part III provides a detailed overview of the expansive, inter-
mediate, and restrictive approaches used by the circuits in determin-
ing what actions constitute adverse employment actions. Part IV 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Further, 
Part IV argues that the circuits should adopt the expansive approach, 
explains why they should adopt the expansive approach, and sets forth 
the effect this approach will have on employees and employers. Part V 
concludes that the expansive approach is the best policy approach be-
cause: (1) its broad definition of adverse employment action provides 
employees complete protection against unlawful retaliation; (2) it es-
tablishes a threshold level of substantiality that must be met for unlaw-
ful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause; 
(3) it effectuates the letter and purpose of Tide VII; (4) it is not out-
come determinative; and (5) it facilitates conformity between § 2000e-
3 and § 2000e-2 of Tide VII. 
5. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243). 
6. See, e.g., id. (quoting Munday, 126 F.3d at 243). 
7. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Page v. 
Bolger, 645 F.2d 227,233 (4th Cir. 1981) (defining "ultimate employment 
decisions") ). 
8. See, e.g., id. 
9. See id. 
2005] Adverse Employment Action 315 
II. THE TITLE VII BURDEN-SHIFfING FRAMEWORK 
Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act protects two 
kinds of conduct against retaliation. 1O First, an employee is protected 
from retaliation for participating in any administrative or judicial in-
vestigation, proceeding, or hearing, to enforce rights under Title 
VILlI Second, an employee is protected from retaliation for oppos-
ing, in good faith, any practices that the employee reasonably believes 
are prohibited by Title VIU2 
In retaliation cases, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of retaliation. 13 Specifically, the plaintiff 
must show that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the 
employer was aware of the plaintiff's protected participation or oppo-
sition, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment decision 
thereafter, and (4) some causal connection exists between the activity 
and the adverse employment action. 14 These elements must be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 15 
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to produce evidence of "a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action."16 If the employer meets 
this burden, the presumption of retaliation is negated, and the plain-
tiff is then required to present evidence proving that the reason of-
fered by the employer was in reality a pretext for unlawful 
discriminationP The plaintiff can do this by establishing that the de-
fendant's proffered reason: "(1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not actu-
ally motivate the adverse action; or (3) was insufficient to motivate the 
adverse action."18 Throughout this burden-shifting framework, "the 
plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion."19 
Despite the circuit courts' universal adoption of this burden-shifting 
framework for analyzing retaliation claims, these courts vary widely as 
to how each element is satisfied. Specifically, the circuit courts disa-
gree as to the meaning of adverse employment action.20 
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). 
11. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. See, e.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537,541 (6th Cir. 2003). 
14. [d. (citing Strouss v. Mich. Dep't of Co IT., 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559,563 (6th Cir. 2000». 
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 542 (quoting Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563). 
17. [d. (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 
(6th Cir. 1994». 
18. [d. (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084). 
19. [d. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993». 
20. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. 
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III. THE EXPANSIVE, INTERMEDIATE, AND RESTRICTIVE 
APPROACHES 
The circuits are split three ways regarding the meaning of adverse 
employment action in the retaliation context. The United States 
Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits, as well as the EEOC, have adopted the expansive ap-
proach. These circuits define adverse employment action broadly to 
include any action that is reasonably likely to deter alleged victims or 
others from engaging in future protected activities.21 However, the 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits take the intermediate approach, 
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that 
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.22 The 
21. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that employer's elimination of employee meetings, termination of flexible 
start-time policy, institution of workplace "Iockdown," disproportionate re-
duction in an employee's workload and salary, and creation of a hostile 
work environment amount to adverse employment actions); Wideman v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
adverse employment actions include a requirement that an employee work 
without a lunch break, giving an employee a one-day suspension, soliciting 
other employees for negative statements about a particular employee, 
changing an employee's schedule without notification, making negative 
comments about an employee, and needlessly delaying authorization for 
medical treatment); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that retaliation includes "actions like moving the person from a 
spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previ-
ously available support services . . . or cutting off challenging assign-
ments"); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (lOth Cir. 1996) 
(holding that adverse employment action includes malicious prosecution 
against a former employee); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (lst 
Cir. 1994) (holding that "demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assign-
ments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toler-
ation of harassment by other employees" constitute adverse employment 
actions); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-32 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that an employer's cancellation of a public event honoring an 
employee can constitute an adverse employment action under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act [hereinafter ADEA], which has an anti-re-
taliation provision parallel to that in Title VII); U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 8-II.D.3, available at hup:/ / 
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html(last modified July 6,2000) [herein-
after EEOC MANUAL] (adverse employment action means "any adverse 
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to 
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity"). 
22. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001); Robin-
son v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
"retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an em-
ployee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ... 
[to] constitute [an] 'adverse employment action"'); Torres v. Pisano, 116 
F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that in order to demonstrate an ad-
verse employment action, an employee must demonstrate "a materially ad-
verse change in the terms and conditions of employment") (quoting 
McKenney v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 903 F. Supp. 619, 623 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995». 
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Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the restrictive approach, holding that 
only ultimate employment decisions-such as hiring, firing, promot-
ing, and demoting-constitute actionable adverse employment 
actions.23 
A. Expansive Approach 
A majority of the circuits, as well as the EEOC, have adopted an 
expansive definition of adverse employment action, which encom-
passes any action that is reasonably likely to deter the alleged victim or 
others from engaging in future protected activity.24 An example is 
Ray v. Henderson,25 a case decided in 2000 by the United"~tates Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
The plaintiff in this case was William Ray, a rural postal carrier in 
Willits, California, who alleged retaliation by his superiors for his in-
volvement in protected activity.26 At the Willits Post Office, Ray's im-
mediate supervisor was Dale Briggs and the Postmaster was Dan 
Carey.27 In 1994, Ray and some of his co-workers grew anxious about 
sexual bias and harassment directed toward female employees at the 
Willits Post Office.28 A female employee first addressed this harass-
ment at an Employee Involvement meeting in March 1994, when the 
employee raised her hand and asked to speak.29 Carey, however, "im-
mediately wheeled around, swinging his arm, yelled and pointed. He 
ordered [the employee] out of the meeting."30 Mter the female em-
ployee left, Ray raised his objections to the negative treatment of fe-
male employees at the post office.31 Carey denied the charges and 
called Ray a "liar.,,32 
Ray again complained about the treatment of female employees at 
the post office at a Rural Carriers Employee Involvement meeting in 
April 1994.33 Again, Carey refuted the charges.34 Because these com-
plaints were continuously denied and ignored, Ray, along with two of 
his co-workers, wrote a letter to Lito Sa jones, Carey's supervisor, con-
23. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 782 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Page v. 
Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981))); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 
F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that "a transfer involving minor 
changes in working conditions and no reduction in payor benefits" is not 
an adverse employment action). 
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
25. 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000). 
26. [d. at 1237, 1239. 
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cerning the complaints.35 Following this letter, Briggs and Carey pub-
licly berated Rayon numerous occasions.36 During a staff meeting in 
November 1994, Ray made a proposal for improving efficiency, for 
which Briggs scolded him.37 In December 1994, Carey called Ray a 
"rabble rouser" and a "troublemaker," and threatened to cancel all 
future Employee Involvement meetings.38 Further, Carey threatened 
to end the "self management" policy that permitted the employees to 
establish the times they would come to and leave work.39 Additionally, 
Ray was forced to leave a meeting with Briggs and Carey concerning 
the employees' rights to communicate with each other after Carey re-
buked him and made intimidating gestures.40 
In Febru~ry 1995, Carey followed through on his threat and elimi-
nated the Employee Involvement program and the self management 
policy.41 Specifically, all carriers in rural areas were obligated to start 
work at 7:00 a.m.42 This change resulted in less time for Ray to sort 
letters and magazines before he began his route, and forced him to 
stay at work later in the day so he could complete administrative work 
that he had, prior to the change in policy, been able to complete ear-
lier in the day.43 In May 1995, Ray requested permission to begin 
working at 6:30 a.m. in order to leave work early to care for his ailing 
wife.44 Briggs agreed, but he threatened to withdraw this concession 
on numerous occasions.45 
Briggs' and Carey's hostility toward Ray continued through the fall 
of 1995.46 Once, during an office meeting, Briggs yelled at Ray to 
'''shut up' and 'that's a direct order."'47 Moreover, false misconduct 
charges were levied against Rayon two separate occasions.48 
Ray requested counseling with the EEOC in October 1995, alleging 
that the management at the Willits Post Office employed a "singling-
out-and-punish method of controlling and frightening and eventually 
demoralizing the workers."49 Additionally, Ray's EEOC request 
averred that four people had vocalized to him their feeling that the 
35. Id. 
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Superintendent of Postal Operations should be killed, demonstrating 
that the issue was not isolated to his complaints. 50 
In November 1995, Ray went on stress leave.51 During that time, 
Carey received a copy of Ray's [EEOC] complaint and instituted a 
"lockdown" at the post office. 52 Carey alleged that the lockdown was 
necessary "because Ray's complaint to the [EEOC] contained a death 
threat. "53 Briggs then ordered Ray not to return to work pending the 
Postal Inspector's investigation into whether the letter was in fact a 
threat. 54 Ray was allowed to return to work after the Inspector con-
cluded that the letter did not contain a death threat.55 Nevertheless, 
Bill Wilber, a temporary supervisor, told the employees that Ray had 
made a death threat.56 Further, Carey terminated Ray's 6:30 a.m. start 
time and required him to report for work at 7:00 a.m.57 This action 
was taken "in response to the supposed death threat ... because [Ray] 
'had to be supervised at all times.' "58 
Ray then wrote four complaint letters to the EEOC between Decem-
ber 1995 and April 1996.59 Ray's route was then lessened by ninety 
boxes. This reduction cost Ray approximately $3,000 out of his yearly 
salary.60 Although all postal workers' routes were to some degree de-
creased, Ray's decrease was the most severe.61 
On May 28, 1997, an administrative law judge (ALJ) heard Ray's 
complaint.62 "The ALJ found that the United States Postal Service 
(USPS) had retaliated against Ray after he filed his written EEOC 
counseling request."63 The USPS denied these findings on August 13, 
1997.64 Ray responded with a complaint filed in federal district court, 
alleging, among other claims, that the USPS retaliated against him for 
engaging in protected activity.65 The district court granted the 
USPS's motion for summary judgment, and Ray appealed to the Ninth 
Circuit. 66 
50. [d. at 1238-39. 
51. [d. at 1239. 
52. [d. Lock-down means that the loading dock doors were to be locked at all 
times. [d. The result was that for each carrier, entry into the docks which 














66. [d. On appeal, Ray chose to challenge the grant of summary judgment only 
as to the retaliation claim. [d. 
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On appeal, the parties stipulated that Ray's EEOC complaints re-
garding the treatment of female employees were protected activities, 
but disputed whether Ray suffered adverse employment actions.67 In 
particular, Ray asserted that, in retaliation for staging complaints, Ca-
rey and Briggs disbanded the Employee Involvement program, abol-
ished flexible start times, introduced lockdowns, cut back his 
workload (and hence his salary), and reduced his workload dispropor-
tionately to reductions imposed on other employees.68 
The Ninth Circuit began by acknowledging the three-way split 
among the circuits in defining adverse employment action.69 The 
Ninth Circuit continued by observing that it has already "found that a 
wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace constitute ad-
verse employment actions."70 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
these cases place it with those circuits that take an expansive view of 
the type of actions that can be considered adverse employment 
actions. 71 
Despite this precedent, the USPS argued that the Ninth Circuit 
should adopt the restrictive approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits.72 The USPS relied on the 1998 United States Supreme Court 
case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,73 "for the proposition that 
only ultimate employment actions such as 'hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities 
[and] a decision causing a significant change in benefits' constitute 
adverse employment actions. ,,74 
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that Burlington Industries dealt 
with employment actions that subject employers to vicarious responsi-
67. Id. at 1240. 
68. Id. at 1243-44. 
69. Id. at 1240. 
70. Id. at 1240-41 (discussing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that dissemination of an unfavorable job reference is an 
adverse employment action, even though the poor reference did not affect 
the prospective employer's decision not to hire the plaintiff); see also 
Strother v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 869 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that while "mere ostracism" by co-workers does not consti-
tute an adverse employment action, a lateral transfer does; and adverse em-
ployment actions also include exclusions from meetings, seminars, and 
positions that would make an employee eligible for salary increases, as well 
as being given a more burdensome work schedule while being denied sec-
retarial support); Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that "[tJransfers of job duties and undeserved performance rat-
ings, if proven, would constitute 'adverse employment decisions'''); St.John 
v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 642 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
a transfer to another job of the same pay and status may constitute an ad-
verse employment action). 
71. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240. 
72. Id. at 1242. 
73. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
74. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1242 n.5. 
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biIity for harassment, if such acts are taken by supervisors.75 Further, 
the Ninth Circuit pointed out that despite the Supreme Court's cita-
tion to circuit court Title VII cases defining adverse employment ac-
tions, the Court specifically did not adopt those cases' holdings: 
"Without endorsing the specific results of those decisions, we think it 
prudent to import the concept of a tangible employment action for 
resolution of the vicarious liability issue we consider here."76 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits' restrictive approach because the court could not rec-
oncile such a rule with its prior decisions.77 Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit noted it had already held that lateral transfers, unfavorable 
references that have no affect on a prospective employer's hiring deci-
sions, and the imposition of a more burdensome work schedule do 
not constitute ultimate employment actions.78 Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that it could not adopt the intermediate approach uti-
lized by the Second and Third Circuits because that approach did not 
comport with Ninth Circuit precedent. 79 In particular, the Ninth Cir-
cuit observed that although "some actions that [it] consider[s] to be 
adverse (such as disadvantageous transfers or changes in work sched-
ules) do 'materially affect the terms and conditions of employment,' 
others (such as an unfavorable reference not affecting an employee's 
job prospects) do not."80 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit looked to the EEOC's interpretation of 
adverse employment action in adopting the expansive approach.81 
The EEOC has interpreted adverse employment action to mean "any 
adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasona-
bly likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in pro-
tected activity."82 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the EEOC 
interpretation includes "lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, 
and changes in work schedules ... [because such] actions are all rea-
sonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activ-
ity."83 The Ninth Circuit did state, however, that this interpretation 
does not contemplate all offensive statements by co-workers because 
not all offensive statements discourage employees from participating 
in protected activity.84 
75. Id. 
76. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761). 





82. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 21, at § 8-II.D.3. 
83. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. 
84. Id. 
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that the EEOC test "effectu-
ates the letter and purpose of Title VII."85 Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a), it is unlawful to discriminate against an employee for exercising 
his right to engage in protected activity.86 As such, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the provision does not constrain the form of discrimina-
tion covered, and neither does the provision require that an action 
meet a minimum gravity.87 In fact, according to the Ninth Circuit, the 
harshness of the action in relation to the employee relates to the mea-
sure of damages, not liability.88 
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit adopted the EEOC test, hold-
ing that an action constitutes "an adverse employment action if it is 
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activ-
ity."89 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that because Briggs' retalia-
tory actions decreased Ray's pay, the amount of time Ray had available 
to complete his assignments, and his ability to voice opinions and af-
fect the post office's policy, the supervisors' behavior qualified as an 
adverse employment action because it was "reasonably likely to deter 
Ray or other employees from complaining about discrimination."9o 
Further, the Ninth Circuit suggested that such activity created a hos-
tile work environment, which can provide the basis for a retaliation 
claim under Title VII.91 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for a trial on the 
merits of the retaliation claim.92 
B. Intennediate Approach 
Another group of circuits has adopted an intermediate approach, 
holding that adverse employment action includes any decision that 
materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.93 An ex-
ample of this approach is the Fourth Circuit case of Von Gunten v. 
Maryland. 94 
In Von Gunten, the plaintiff, Barbara von Gunten, was employed as 
an Environmental Health Aide III by the Maryland Department of the 
Environment (MDE).95 Mter von Gunten's sixth week of work at the 
MDE, William Beatty, the head of the Shellfish Monitoring Section, 
gave von Gunten a favorable review, stating that she had demon-
85. Id. 
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). 
87. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243 (citing Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 
1996)). 
88. Id. (quoting Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1244. 
91. Id. at 1245-46. 
92. Id. at 1246. 
93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
94. 243 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001). 
95. Id. at 861. 
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strated motivation and that she could work well with the other em-
ployees.96 In June 1996, von Gunten was assigned to full-time boat 
work under the supervision of Vernon Burch, collecting water samples 
from the Chesapeake Bay.97 Beatty supervised both von Gunten and 
Burch.98 
Soon after she started working with Burch problems appeared.99 
Von Gunten claimed that Burch "urinated off of the boat, made 
coarse and sexually charged comments toward her, stared at her, and 
touched her without her consent."lOO In August 1996, von Gunten 
complained about the sexual harassment to Beatty.lOI Beatty then 
contacted Burch's supervisor, John Steinfort, who met with Burch, 
von Gunten, and Beatty.102 Beatty and Steinfort distributed the MDE. 
anti-harassment policy to von Gunten and Burch, explaining that sex-
ual harassment between employees was prohibited.103 Mter the meet-
ing, however, von Gunten complained to the supervisors that Burch's 
conduct had worsened. 104 
In December 1996, Beatty watched von Gunten and Burch working. 
He witnessed von Gunten acting unprofessionally, and the next day 
saw Burch strike "von Gunten across the buttocks with an oar."105 
Subsequently, von Gunten requested from Steinfort that she be re-
moved from Burch's boat, to which Steinfort agreed.106 
On the following day, von Gunten told Steinfort that she planned to 
communicate her harassment concerns to MDE's Fair Practices Of-
fice.107 That same day, Steinfort contacted Steven Bieber, an MDE 
Fair Practices officer, and MDE's personnel director, to tell them he 
did not believe that von Gunten's claim could be substantiated.108 
The next day, von Gunten mailed a letter to the MDE's Fair Practices 
offices requesting its assistance. 109 In response to von Gunten's letter, 
Bieber undertook an investigation, concluding that despite some evi-
dence of harassment, the harassment did not rise to such a level as to 
constitute an abusive working environmentYo 
96. Id. at 862. 
97. Id. at 861-62. An aide generally spends the three winter months conducting 
shoreline surveys, and the remaining nine months of the year performing 
boat work. Id. 
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Von Gunten claimed that MDE's actions following her letter to 
their Fair Practices Office amounted to unlawful retaliation in viola-
tion of Title VILlll Among MDE's actions were the repossession of 
her state-issued car, a down-grade in her annual evaluation, a reassign-
ment to shoreline survey work, improperly handled administrative af-
fairs, and retaliatory harassment that created a hostile work 
environment. I 12 
In August 1997, MDE offered von Gunten a new aide position, 
which "would have required her to spend less time on boat work and 
more time performing shoreline surveys."ll3 Additionally, the new 
position would have required von Gunten to spend more time work-
ing in the same field office as Beatty and Steinfort, likely increasing 
their contact.1l4 Von Gunten declined the offer. ll5 
Von Gunten met with officials from MDE's Fair Practices Office 
concerning her claims of harassment and retaliation in October 
1997Y6 Believing that the MDE Fair Practice officers were uncon-
cerned with her claims, von Gunten resigned the following monthY 7 
After receiving notice from the EEOC of her right to sue, von 
Gunten filed suit against MDE, alleging sexual harassment, construc-
tive discharge, and retaliation under Title VIL l18 The district court 
granted MDE's motion for summary judgment concerning her con-
structive discharge and retaliation claimsY9 The court denied sum-
mary judgment of von Gunten's sexual harassment claim.120 The 
sexual harassment claim was tried before a jury, which returned a ver-
dict in favor of MDE.121 Von Gunten then appealed the jury verdict to 
the Fourth Circuit. 122 
The Fourth Circuit initially responded to the EEOC view that, un-
like 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), which prohibits discriminatory em-
ployment action, § 2000e-3 prohibits both adverse employment 
actions, and "any retaliatory conduct by an employer that is reasonably 
likely to deter protected activity."123 The Fourth Circuit noted that it 
had repeatedly held that retaliation claims, like discrimination claims, 
require proof of an adverse employment action. 124 The Fourth Cir-
Ill. Id. 
112. Id. at 862-63. 










123. Id. at 863 n.l; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 through 3 (2003). 
124. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863 n.l (citing Ross v. Communications Satellite 
Corp., 759 F.2d 355,365 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
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cuit continued by acknowledging Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 
which explained that Congress did not express a greater intent to pre-
clude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for precluding discrimination 
under § 2000e-2.I25 As such, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that 
absent strong policy considerations to the contrary, the courts should 
construe the provisions of Title VII uniformly.126 
Next, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issues of how to define ad-
verse employment action, and whether MDE's actions constituted 
such conduct. I27 Von Gunten and the EEOC argued that the lower 
court's definition of adverse employment action as an "'ultimate em-
ployment decision' involving hiring, granting leave, discharging, pro-
moting, or compensating" was far too narrow. 128 MDE rejected this 
interpretation of the lower court's analysis, arguing that the court did 
not adopt such a narrow interpretation of adverse employment ac-
tion. 129 Instead, MDE argued that the district court properly defined 
adverse employment action as employer conduct that alters the 
"terms, conditions, or benefits of employment" in a discriminatory 
manner.130 
The Fourth Circuit next stated that differentiating between the two 
standards is difficult. 131 To illustrate this contention, the Fourth Cir-
cuit pointed out that despite most circuits' rejection of the restrictive 
approach in Title VII retaliation cases, these courts still "recognize [ ] 
that 'there is some threshold level of substantiality that must be met 
for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation 
clause."'132 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit observed that the similarity 
between the two standards is exemplified by the fact that although the 
Eighth Circuit has formally adopted the restrictive approach, it con-
tinually applies a broader standard. I33 Further, the Fourth Circuit ob-
served that if strictly applied, the restrictive approach, may be 
outcome determinative in that its application would prevent von 
Gunten from making out a prima facie case, as none of MDE's acts 
125. Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 366). 
126. Id. (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 366). 
127. Id. at 863. 
128. Id. at 863-64. 
129. Id. at 864. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. (quoting Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th 
Cir. 1998)). 
133. Id. (citing Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding that working conditions that constitute a material employ-
ment disadvantage and tangible changes in working conditions would be 
ultimate employment decisions)); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 
1060 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that ultimate employment decisions include 
reducing employee duties, actions that disadvantage or interfere with an 
employee's ability to perform job functions, "papering" employment files 
with negative reports and reprimands despite the employee not being dis-
charged, demoted, or suspended). 
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amounted to an ultimate employment decision (such as hiring, firing, 
refusal to promote, etc.).134 
Thus, because the Fourth Circuit had already expressed preference 
for conformity between § 2000e-2 and § 2000e-3135 and implicitly re-
jected the view that "nothing less than an 'ultimate employment deci-
sion' can constitute adverse employment action under § 2000e-3,"136 
the Von Gunten court adopted the intermediate approach, which de-
fines adverse employment action as "any retaliatory act or harassment 
if, but only if, that act or harassment results in an adverse effect on the 
'terms, conditions, or benefits' of employment."137 The Fourth Cir-
cuit then applied the intermediate approach to von Gunten's claims 
that MDE unlawfully retaliated against her by: (1) withdrawing her use 
of a state vehicle, (2) "downgrading" her end of the year performance 
review, (3) reassigning her to shoreline survey work, (4) improperly 
treating a variety of administrative matters, and (5) retaliating against 
her by creating a hostile work environment. 138 
First, the Von Gunten court held that MDE's decision to deny von 
Gunten the use of a state vehicle was not an adverse employment ac-
tion sufficient to support a Title VII retaliation claim because it was 
unclear that use of the car was a benefit of employment, and because 
von Gunten could not have expected to use the vehicle perma-
nently.139 Second, the Von Gunten court held that MDE's decision to 
downgrade von Gunten's end-of-the-year evaluation was not an ad-
verse employment action because, at the time of the review, MDE was 
in the process of changing to a different evaluation form and von 








Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 864 (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 
F.3d 702,705-08 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that negative reviews requiring an 
employee to lose pay increases, requiring an employee to wear an unsafe 
fire protection suit, verbally threatening to fire an employee, improperly 
placing in jeopardy an employee's continuation in an apprenticeship pro-
gram, and committing numerous other acts of harassment causing an em-
ployee to suffer depression and panic attacks, did not reach the level of 
adverse employment action)). 
Id. at 865 (quoting Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 
366 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
Id. (citing Ross, 759 F.2d at 363) (holding that actions such as reducingjob 
responsibilities and professional status, denying performance reviews and 
annual salary and benefit increases, and providing false information to po-
tential employers, if proven, could rise to adverse employment action); 
Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(observing that" [iJ n no case in this circuit have we found an adverse em-
ployment· action to encompass a situation where the employer has in-
structed employees to ignore and spy on an employee who engaged in 
protected activity, without evidence that the terms, conditions, or benefits of her 
employment were adversely aJJectetl') (emphasis added)). 
Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866. 
Id. at 867-70. 
Id. at 867. 
Id. at 867-68. 
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Gunten court held that MDE's decision to postpone von Gunten's end-
of-the-year evaluation by one month was not an adverse employment 
action in violation of Title VII because there was no indication that 
the postponement adversely affected von Gunten. 14I Fourth, the Von 
Gunten court held that MDE's decision to reassign von Gunten from 
boat work to shoreline survey work did not rise to unlawful retaliation 
because the change was not truly significant. 142 Fifth, even after con-
sidering all of MDE's acts, the Von Gunten court concluded that the 
totality of the actions did not constitute "retaliatory harassment creat-
ing a hostile work environment."143 For these reasons, the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.144 
C. Restrictive Approach 
A third group of circuits has adopted a restrictive approach, hold-
ing that only ultimate employment actions (such as hiring, termina-
tion, promotion, and demotion) constitute adverse employment 
actions. 145 An example of this approach is the Fifth Circuit case of 
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak CO. 146 
In Mattern, the plaintiff, Jean Mattern, was an employee with East-
man Kodak Co. and was enrolled in Eastman's mechanic's apprentice-
ship program.147 The program's two components consisted of on-the-
job training and classroom instruction.148 To complete the program, 
apprentices were required to successfully complete fourteen "review 
cycles."149 Adequate performance through each cycle resulted in pay 
increases. 15o "Major Skills Tests" were also part of the program. 151 An 
apprentice could be removed from the program for receiving three 
unsatisfactory "review cycle" assessments or failing three Major Skills 
Tests. 152 
In March 1993, Mattern filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC.153 
In her filed charge, Mattern alleged that she was sexually harassed by 
two members of her on-the-job training crew, Godwin and Roberts.154 
She further alleged that the harassment created a hostile work envi-
141. Id. at 867 n.5. 
142. Id. 
143. [d. at 869-70. 
144. [d. at 870. 
145. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
146. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). 





152. [d. at 703-04. 
153. [d. at 704. 
154. Id. 
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ronment, and that her supeIVisors not only knew of the harassment, 
but condoned it. 155 
Eastman had become aware of and began investigating Mattern's 
claims in early March. 156 Although no action was taken against Rob-
erts, Eastman allowed Godwin to retire early.157 Mattern was then 
transferred to a different crew in the same department; thus, she 
worked under another supeIVisor, while she retained the same depart-
mental managers. 158 
Mattern continued to encounter difficulties on the job, which she 
believed to be unlawful retaliation, and which led to her resignation 
in July 1993.159 Mattern sued Eastman in November 1993, alleging 
that Eastman retaliated against her, and that Eastman allowed employ-
ees to retaliate against her for her report of harassment to the 
EEOC. 160 
Mattern's retaliation claim was based on five events. 161 First, East-
man began disciplinary proceedings against Godwin on the same day 
that Mattern informed Drennan that she suffered from a work-related 
illness. 162 Mattern was directed by Drennan to report her work-related 
illness to Eastman's medical department. 163 Mattern, however, de-
cided to take a vacation day and left for home. 164 Eastman then sent 
Drennan, and another one of Mattern's supeIVisors, Holstead, to Mat-
tern's house to direct her to report to Eastman's medical 
department. I 65 
Second, in March 1993, Mattern was disciplined for failing to be at 
her workstation when her supeIVisors were trying to find her.166 She 
was not there because she was reporting the hostility she believed she 
was receiving to Eastman's Human Resources Department. 167 
Third, Mattern alleged that her co-workers became antagonistic to-
ward her following Godwin's departure.168 Specifically, her co-workers 
did not say "hello" to her, muttered that "accidents happen," and stole 
tools out of her locker. 169 Mattern alleged that Eastman took no steps 















169. [d. (internal quotations omitted). 
170. [d. 
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Fourth, Mattern claimed that Eastman failed to respond to Mat-
tern's doctor's concerns that her illnesses and anxiety were attributa-
ble to the hostilitY that she was receiving at Eastman. 171 
Fifth; Mattern received a negative review following her EEOC 
charge, which prevented her from receiving a raise, and she was 
placed on "final warning of discharge from the apprenticeship pro-
gram."172 Notably, Mattern received negative evaluations from super-
visors who previously had commended her work.173 Many of these 
poor reviews were the result of Mattern's failure to restore centrifugal 
pumps. 174 Additionally, Mattern failed two of her Major Skills 
Tests.175 
A jury found that Eastman had retaliated against Mattern and 
awarded her $50,000 in damages.176 Eastman then appealed to the 
Fifth Circuit. 177 
The Fifth Circuit began by acknowledging that it had already held 
that "Tide VII was designed to address ultimate employment deci-
sions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably 
might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions."178 
According to the Fifth Circuit, hiring, leave, discharge, promotion, 
and compensation decisions constitute ultimate employment deci-
sions.179 The Fifth Circuit then concluded that co-worker hostility, 
stolen tools, and the resultant anxiety, alone, do not amount to ad-
verse employment actions. 180 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held Dren-
nan's visit to Mattern's home, the verbal threat of discharge, the 
warning for being away from her workstation, a lost increase in pay, 
and Mattern's placement on "final warning" was not tantamount to 
adverse employment actions because none of the acts complained of 
had demonstrable consequences. 181 Specifically, the Mattern court 
held that the actions Mattern complained of "were at most 'tangential' 
to future decisions that might be ultimate employment decisions."182 
To illustrate, the Fifth Circuit stated that although the future possi-
bility of discharge from the apprenticeship program existed for Mat-
tern, that is quite distinct from actual discharge. 183 Additionally, the 
Mattern court held that although the acts Mattern complained of may 





176. [d. at 704. 
177. See id. 
178. [d. at 707 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995». 
179. [d. 
180. [d. 
181. [d. at 708. 
182. [d. 
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have increased the chance of eventual adverse employment actions, 
the acts themselves were not ultimate employer decisions, and they 
had merely a tangential effect on speculative future ultimate employer 
decisions.184 
The Fifth Circuit continued, stating that another rule would im-
properly enlarge the scope of adverse employment action to include 
"disciplinary filings, supervisor's reprimands, and even poor perform-
ance by the employee-anything which might jeopardize employment 
in the future."185 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that adverse em-
ployment action refers only to ultimate employment decisions-not 
decisions that may lead to ultimate employment decisions. 186 
The Mattern court found support for this rule in the language of 
Title VII.187 In particular, the Fifth Circuit examined the differences 
between Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, and 
Title VII's general anti-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2.188 The Mattern court first noted that the general anti-discrimina-
tion provision precludes employers from limiting, segregating, or clas-
sifying employees in ways that deprive or might deprive any 
individual's employment opportunities or would adversely affect his 
status as an employee. 189 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title 
VII's anti-retaliation simply forbids employers from discriminating 
against employees for taking protected action.190 
The Fifth Circuit concluded: "The anti-retaliation provision speaks 
only of 'discrimination'; there is no mention of the vague harms con-
templated in § 2000e-2(a)(2). Therefore, [the anti-retaliation] provi-
sion can only be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include 
only ultimate employment decisions."191 For these reasons, the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the jury's conclusion that Eastman unlawfully retali-
ated against Mattern.192 
N. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Intermediate Approach 
Under the intermediate approach, adverse employment action is 
defined as "discriminatory acts or harassment [that] adversely [affect] 





188. Id. at 708-09; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 through 3 (2003). 
189. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2003». 
190. Id. at 708 (citing 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-3 (2003». 
191. Id. at 709. 
192. Id. at 710. 
193. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (quot-
ing Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997». 
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The intermediate framework is a good approach because it sets out a 
threshold level of substantiality that must be met before unlawful dis-
crimination can be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause. As 
with the expansive approach, adverse employment decisions, under 
the intermediate approach, include ultimate employment decisions, 
reducingjob responsibilities and professional status, denying perform-
ance reviews and annual salary and benefit increases, as well as provid-
ing false information to potential employers. Because of this 
threshold, not every offensive remark made by a co-worker will consti-
tute an adverse employment action warranting a retaliation claim. 
Thus, employers need not worry about trivial utterances resulting in 
liability. 
Despite this strength, the intermediate approach is inferior to the 
expansive approach. Unlike the expansive approach, discriminatory 
acts alone, such as supervisor ostracism, spying on employees, pranks 
against employees, and creating an overall hostile work environment, 
do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions. A cause of 
action for retaliation will arise only if this discrimination affects the 
"terms, conditions, or benefits" of employment. Thus, under the in-
termediate approach, an employer who retaliates against an employee 
for filing a complaint with the EEOC by verbally abusing the em-
ployee, and/or encouraging other employees to harass the employee, 
is not subject to liability for unlawful retaliation because such activity 
does not affect "the 'terms, conditions, or benefits' of 
employment."194 
This hypothetical illustrates that the intermediate approach is 
overly restrictive because it allows employers to retaliate against em-
ployees and/ or harass employees in ways that fall short of constituting 
ultimate employment decisions, or resulting in an adverse effect on 
"the 'terms, conditions, or benefits of employment."'195 Accordingly, 
the intermediate approach is not the best policy approach because it 
does not provide employees with complete protection from employer 
retaliation. 
B. Restrictive Approach 
Under the restrictive approach, only ultimate employment deci-
sions, such as hiring, termination, promotion, and demotion, consti-
tute adverse employment actions.196 The circuits that have adopted 
the expansive and intermediate approaches correctly agree that the 
restrictive approach is not the best approach for three reasons. First, 
the restrictive approach severely limits an employee's ability to seek 
recourse when he or she is retaliated against or harassed for engaging 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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in protected activity. Section 2000e-3 prohibits employers from retali-
ating against employees for engaging in protected behavior. 197 The 
restrictive approach, however, only recognizes a cause of action for 
retaliation, in violation of Title VII, where the adverse employment 
action concerned hiring, termination, promotion, or demotion. 198 
Thus, under the restrictive approach, employers can avoid the conse-
quences of 2000e-3, while still retaliating against an employee, by im-
plementing a number of tactics that fall short of ultimate employment 
actions. For example, under the restrictive approach, after an em-
ployee files a complaint with the EEOC, an employer could increase 
that employee's workload and shorten the amount of time the em-
ployee has to complete the work. 199 Similarly, the employer could cre-
ate a hostile work environment by encouraging other employees to 
verbally abuse that employee and/or steal things from the employee, 
without the employer subjecting itself to liability for unlawful retalia-
tion because these adverse employment actions were not ultimate em-
ployment decisions.20o 
Second, as observed by the Von Gunten court, the restrictive ap-
proach is outcome determinative if strictly applied.201 Consequently, 
if none of an employer's acts amount to ultimate employment deci-
sions, employees are automatically precluded from proving a prima 
facie retaliation case.202 Thus, in a circuit that utilizes the restrictive 
approach, the employee in the example immediately above could not 
make out a prima facie case of retaliation because verbal abuse and 
creating a hostile work environment are not ultimate employment 
decisions. 
Third, circuits that utilize the restrictive approach incorrectly draw 
distinctions between Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e-3, and Title VII's general anti-discrimination provision, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2.203 However, both § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 claims 
"require proof of 'adverse employment action.' "204 Accordingly, as 
the Fourth Circuit has explained, Congress has not expressed a 
greater intent to preclude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for pre-
cluding discrimination under § 2000e-2.205 Therefore, conformity be-
tween § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 is preferred.206 
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2003). 
198. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707. 
199. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000). 
200. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707. 
20l. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858,864 (4th Cir. 2001). 
202. See id. 
203. See, e.g., Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707. 
204. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 863 n.l (citing Ross v. Communications Satellite 
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
205. Id. (quoting Rnss, 759 F.2d at 366). 
206. Id. (quoting Rnss, 759 F.2d at 366). 
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C. Expansive Approach 
Under the expansive approach, adverse employment action encom-
passes any action that is likely to deter the alleged victim or others 
from engaging in protected activity.207 This interpretation, however, 
does not extend to every insult made by a co-worker because such 
statements do not "deter employees from engaging in protected activ-
ity."208 The circuits should adopt the expansive approach for five 
reasons. 
First, its broad definition of adverse employment action provides 
employees more complete protection against unlawful retaliation.209 
The intermediate and restrictive approaches expose employees to po-
tential retaliation because they allow employers to retaliate against 
employees and/or harass employees in ways that fall short of constitut-
ing ultimate employment decisions, or result in an "adverse effect on 
the 'terms, conditions, or benefits of employment."'210 Thus, under 
the expansive approach, an employer who eliminates an employee's 
lunch break,211 or deprives an employee of previously available sup-
port services,212 may be subject to liability for unlawful retaliation, 
even though such activities do not involve ultimate employment deci-
sions, and do not adversely affect the "terms, benefits, or conditions" 
of employment. 
Second, this standard establishes a threshold level of substantiality 
that must be met for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under 
the anti-retaliation clause. In particular, the expansive approach does 
not encompass every insult made by employees.213 Instead, it pre-
cludes only those activities reasonably likely to "deter employees from 
engaging in protected activity."214 For example, unlawful retaliation 
will occur when a supervisor instructs employees to harass another 
employee because that employee filed a complaint with the EEOC. 
On the other hand, one employee's off-handed derogatory remark to 
another employee, who previously filed a complaint with the EEOC, 
will not subject an employer to liability for retaliation. Thus, this ob-
jective standard gives employers guidance as to what type of behavior 
rises to the level of unlawful retaliation, and protects employers from 
liability for every trivial utterance that offends an employee or every 
trivial employment decision that an employee does not like. 
207. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). 
208. Id. 
209. See supra Part III.A (discussing the expansive approach). 
210. See supra Part IILA-B (discussing the intermediate and restrictive 
approaches) . 
211. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1455, 1456 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
212. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996). 
213. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. 
214. Id. 
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Third, as the EEOC and the circuits that have adopted the expan-
sive approach have recognized, this broad definition of adverse em-
ployment action "effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII."215 
Section 2000e-3(a) states that it is unlawful "for an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee because he engaged in protected activ-
ity."216 This language in no way limits the severity of an employment 
action's ultimate impact on an employee.217 Rather, this language is 
focused on preventing employers from taking any discriminatory ac-
tion against an employee because that employee engaged in protected 
activity. As such, discrimination in violation of § 2000e-3 should in-
clude ultimate employment decisions (termination, promotion, and 
demotion), retaliatory acts or harassment that adversely affects the 
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment (reducing job responsi-
bilities and professional status, denying performance reviews and an-
nual salary and benefit increases, unfavorable job references, lateral 
transfers, and changes in work schedules), as well as ostracism, spying, 
and pranks.218 In fact, such actions "are all reasonably likely to deter 
employees from engaging in protected activity"219 because such activ-
ity may intimidate employees to the point that they are reluctant to 
file charges of discrimination.22o 
Fourth, the expansive approach is not outcome determinative. 
Under this framework, even if an employer's action does not rise to 
the level of ultimate employment decisions, or retaliatory acts or har-
assment that adversely affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of em-
ployment, an employee can still make out a prima facie case of 
retaliation.221 For example, an employee who is moved from a well-lit, 
spacious office to a small, dark office, can still make out a prima facie 
case of retaliation, even though this employment decision is not an 
ultimate employment decision, and does not adversely affect the 
terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.222 
Fifth, the expansive approach does not incorrectly draw distinctions 
between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2. Both § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 
claims "require proof of an 'adverse employment action.' "223 Accord-
ingly, it is clear from the face of the statute that Congress did not 
express a greater intent to preclude retaliation under § 2000e-3 than 
for precluding discrimination under § 2000e-2.224 The expansive ap-
215. See, e.g., id. 
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). 
217. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243. 
218. See, e.g., id. 
219. Id. 
220. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456. 
221. See id. 
222. See Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334. 
223. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863 n.l (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
224. Id. (citing Ross, 759 F.2d at 366). 
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proach facilitates the preferred conformity between § 2000e-3 and 
§ 2000e-2 by not making distinctions between the two provisions.225 
V. CONCLUSION 
The circuits are split three ways as to what constitutes an adverse 
employment action in order for an employee to establish a prima fa-
cie case of retaliation under § 704(a) of Tide VII. One group of cir-
cuits, as well as the EEOC, adopts an expansive approach, defining 
adverse employment action broadly to include any action that is rea-
sonably likely to deter alleged victims or others from engaging in fu-
ture protected activity.226 A second group of circuits adopts an 
intermediate approach, holding that adverse employment action in-
cludes any decision that materially affects the terms, conditions or 
benefits of employment. 227 A third group of circuits adopts a restric-
tive approach, holding that only ultimate employment actions, such as 
hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting constitute actionable adverse 
employment actions.228 
In light of this inconsistency, the circuits should universally adopt 
the expansive approach for five reasons.229 First, its broad definition 
of adverse employment action provides employees complete protec-
tion against unlawful retaliation, which the intermediate and restric-
tive approaches fail to do. Second, this standard establishes a 
threshold level of substantiality that must be met for unlawful discrim-
ination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation clause. As such, 
this objective standard gives employers guidance as to what type of 
behavior rises to the level of unlawful retaliation, as well as protects 
employers from liability for every trivial utterance that offended an 
employee or every trivial employment decision that an employee did 
not like. Third, this broad definition of adverse employment action 
effectuates the letter and purpose of Title VII by preventing employ-
ers from taking any discriminatory action against an employee be-
cause that employee engaged in protected activity. Fourth, the 
expansive approach is not outcome determinative because it does not 
immediately preclude employees from making out a prima facie case 
of retaliation where the employer'S behavior falls short of an ultimate 
employment decision or retaliatory acts or harassment that adversely 
affect the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. Fifth, the ex-
pansive approach facilitates the preferred conformity between 
§ 2000e-3 and § 2000e-2 by not making distinctions between the two 
provisions. 
225. Id. (quoting /Wss, 759 F.2d at 366). 
226. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra Part w.e and accompanying text. 
336 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 34 
For these reasons, it is clear that the expansive approach is the best 
way to protect employees from unlawful retaliation, protect employers 
from frivolous claims, and give employers guidance as to what kinds of 
behavior will constitute retaliation in violation of § 704(a) of Title VII. 
